

## **Yemen-China Relations: History and Development in Bilateral Relations**

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**Abstract:** The present Republic of Yemen (RY) was formed on May 22, 1990 when the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) that lies in the north merged with its southern neighbour, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Before September 1962, the Imamate regime ruled the northern part of Yemen and the southern part mostly controlled by the British. The People's Republic of China (PRC) had an early interest in Yemen that was largely expedited by the alignment between the PRC and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the latter's even earlier involvement in Yemen. Since, the mid-1950s, the PRC had recognized that Yemen is located in a strategic location that is suitable for the socialist regimes to establish its influence before the capitalist gain a foothold in the region. Therefore, the PRC teamed up with the USSR to exploit the Anti-Western sentiments through the provision of financial assistance to the ruling Imamate regime in Yemen. Fortunately for the PRC, Imam Ahmad had a deep-seated aversion for the British and thus favoured the USSR, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the PRC and thus the PRC took the opportunity to get into the good books of Imam Ahmad. By August 1956 both countries had established formal diplomatic relations and the said event was at that time the most significant political development in the region that includes the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. At that time, the nationalist government in Taiwan was recognised by most countries as the legitimate representative of all China and Yemen's recognition of the PRC made it the first Arabian Peninsula country and the third Arabic country to do so. The PRC was cognizant of the fact that such developments was an opportunity for it to fortify the security in the Peninsula region and act as a counterforce against the USSR and the US aspirations to be dominant forces in the region. The PRC was also of the view that Yemen can be a major force to maintain the unity of the Arab states and thus ensure the peace and stability of the Gulf and the Red Sea area. This thesis will investigate the six decade long history of the relationship as well as to understand why up to this point in time there has not been much development. Available data indicate that the PRC's relations with Yemen was basically one-sided, i.e., it was only the PRC's own economic and political interests. Interestingly, the PRC-Yemeni relationship is an early illustration of the 'South-South' cooperation amongst the developing countries.

**Key words:** Yemen, China, relations, diplomatic, development

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### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **Historical and Development of Yemen-China relations:**

From historic evidence we find that both North side and South side of Yemen used to be together as one country. In 1934, "divide and rule", the British colonialist policy divided the country into North Yemen and South Yemen (Shaomin and Weijian, 1982). Since, the 15th century, many countries had their eye on Yemen. Around the Red sea with Yemen there are some other countries specially as the southern gate of the Red Sea, the importance of the Bab al-Mandab Strait began the history of maritime which is important significantly upon the world order of this day. It has its importance in politic, economic, military and

geographic areas which have influenced many conflicts with this strait and many occupations are faced. Back in 15th century until now to protect individual interest from others many international powers tried to gain control of this strait (Yadoomi, 1991).

In the 19th century, the Southern and Northern parts of Yemen was invaded separately by both the British imperialists and the Ottoman Empire. These aggressors took heavy losses from the resistance Yemeni people waved in. The heroic united struggle against outside aggression constitutes a splendid chapter in the history of Yemen.

Yemen achieved its full independence in 1918 when the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the first independent

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Arab country was founded. The Yemeni people were greatly encouraged to liberate Aden and the southern coastal area after driving out the Turks. But then, the employment of a British policy known as “divide and rule” by the British imperialists, who were then trying to shape up Yemen by devising a plan. The defeat of Yemen Kingdom’s in a war with Saudi Arabia was exploited and forced Yemen was forced to sign uneven treaties that made the Southern part of Yemen a legal occupation zone for the British. That is what created South and North Yemen.

The fact of considering the significant the existence of a pattern of bilateral relations between China and Yemen reaching back several centuries. In accordance with the historical perspective of China, the existence of relations since very early times and these were legitimately established from the fifteenth century forwards. These existed historic links are confirmed through other sources, moreover it would be considered as one of the significant aspects of early Yemeni international relations (Wenner, 1967). Chinese statements of support for Yemen were regularly connected with ones of opposition to the British occupation of Aden. Basically, it has importance that Yemen’s opposition to imperialism was offered not just as the action of an individual country, however on the contrary emphasis was placed specifically upon the forms of interactive communication by where Yemen’s anti-imperialism was articulated. This sort of interaction was deliberated at a number of levels of operation which may also be viewed as different levels of analysis of the type of alignments which make up the raw material of united front policy. They would be reviewed as mutually-reinforcing levels of united action which could be helpful of cementing the ‘force’ represented through the developing countries as considering an entity (Biel, 1992). The Chinese side thus strongly responded to al-Badr’s ideas about the historical basis of their collaboration and China’s emphasis upon the dimension of historical links between different parts of Asia in the pre-colonial period can in a way be viewed as constituting what was seen as an objective historical basis for the united front relationship. “But today, when the people of our two countries have now embarked on the road of independence when we have now established new friendly relations, there is no power on earth which can prevent the daily development of our friendship.

#### **THE SILK ROAD AND ITS RETURN**

The historical ties between China and Yemen return back to >2,000 years, when the unique ancient Silk Road connected trade between them and led to cultural

interaction between the Arab and Chinese peoples. Even Prophet Mohamed of Islam mentioned China in one of his sayings when he told his followers, “seek knowledge even if it is in China”. This indicates how far the Arabs looked at the distance between them and China.

The famous overland Silk Road is the most prominent example of this two way flow of people and goods; along it travelled ancient commerce to and from China and Central Asia, the Middle East and beyond. Maritime routes supplemented the Silk Road. Occasional Chinese fleets, most notably the Ming dynasty voyages, journeyed from the South China Sea to Arabian waters to advance commercial interests and the tribute system but these expeditions suffered the fates of political controversy; rulers of China have continuously debated the merits of maritime power “a debate which still continues” (Schieck, 1992). China’s relations with the Arab world can be traced all the way back to the second century at the birth of the Silk Road. “The Silk Road was once the heart of global commerce, a land bridge stretching thousands of mile, connecting China with the Middle East” Trade between China and Arab world thrived from 200-1500 CE “but faded thereafter as political turbulence in Central Asia made the Silk Road too dangerous for the caravans while the newly emergent European powers opened up sea routes to commerce” (Simpfendorfer, 2011). At the same time, the New Silk Route passes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, controlled by Yemen, to the Red Sea. Yemen’s geographic location makes it important for the Chinese “One Belt and One Road” initiative. This includes Yemen’s proximity to the Horn of Africa where Beijing has a substantial economic footprint and its location on the Gulf of Aden, which makes it a strategic location for the Suez Canal (Chaziza, 2015). China in 1990 has been celebrating the 2,000th anniversary of the Silk Road. Aside from enjoying this birthday, one ostensible purpose of the lengthy event is to help clear away the negative image caused by Tiananmen. The June 1989 massacre set China’s diplomatic initiatives back quite a lot, especially with regard to the large industrial powers. But China’s response to repair that episode has been to ply the Middle East with visits, increased trade and economic packages and gradually work her way back into the international mainstream (Schieck, 1992).

#### **CHINA AND YEMEN IN THE 1950 AND 1956S**

The Yemen was a legendary rich and fertile area of the Arab world whose prosperous character was reflected in the Roman name Arabia felix. Question of China’s relations with Yemen thus stands out as an important case

in its own right. The Yemeni-China relationship constitutes an interesting early example of 'South-South' co-operation among developing countries. China's initial involvement in the Yemen in the mid-50s was both facilitated and constrained by the roles of Nasser and the Soviet Union and especially by the intricacies of Yemeni domestic politics. It was Nasser who reportedly persuaded King Saud to finance the Yemen's purchase of Soviet weapons when in 1956, Britain successfully lobbied to prevent Western arms transfers to the regime of Imam Ahmed. Thus, for as long as Nasser's regional ambitions roughly paralleled those of Moscow and for as long as the Sino-Soviet alliance remained firmly intact, China appeared to have an entree in the Yemen (Calabrese, 1991). In Cairo, Burhan Chairman of the China Islamic Association and holder of impressive political credentials had an interview with Amir (prince) al-Badr, premier of the Yemen and with his brother. The 4 days later, the Yemen recognised the PRC through the Chinese ambassador in Cairo (Shichor, 1979).

The establishment of formal relations with Yemen was PRC's most significant political development in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region at that time. Its significance is that Yemen was the first country in the Arabian Peninsula and the third country in the Arab world, to acknowledge the PRC as the legitimate representative of all China when most other countries in the world recognised the nationalist government in Taiwan as the legitimate representative of China (Binhuwaidin, 2001) (Appendix in Table 1).

According to An Huihou, former Chinese ambassador to Egypt, Yemen connects the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula and is midway between Europe and China, making Yemen an important trade route and potential liaison between China and these areas as well as being rich in petroleum resources. An also said that China has sent warships to escort ships and combat pirates near the Arabian Peninsula where Yemen is located and its location means it can play a role in future bilateral cooperation on anti-piracy operations. Yin Gang, an expert on Middle East studies with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said China enjoys a good reputation in Yemen due to their sound bilateral relationship and China's principle of non interference of internal affairs in other countries. China first offered aid to Yemen as far back as the 1960s when China was suffering from economic hardships of its own, according to Yin. It built the first highway between the Yemeni capital Sana'a and the western port city of Hodeida and in recent years it has financed and carried out many projects in major cities such as key bridges and hospitals in Sana'a (Jiangxi, 2013).

Another would, however, be the strategic dimension. Chinese sources remarked upon Yemen's "immensely important strategic position, dominating the mouth of the Red Sea" Linked with this, there was the question of the country's economic potential. The Chinese press had already, in 1956, remarked upon Yemen's "extremely rich" resources, hitherto undeveloped. The country had supported a thriving agriculture in the past and was considered potentially to be one of the most fertile parts of the Middle East. Particularly significant is the official view that Yemen was rich in oil resources. This view was supported by the Chinese both in 1957 and again during Mohamed al-Badr's visit (Biel, 1992). Nevertheless, Yemen remains significant for China primarily due to its geo-strategic location. Most of China's trade with Europe (about 25% of total exports) travels through the Bab al-Mandeb, the waterway that separates Yemen from Djibouti which in recent years has been threatened by piracy. Violent upheaval including the possibility that Yemen, like Somalia might become a failed state could place Chinese commercial interests further at risk (Calabrese, 2013).

#### **THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE, AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY ORGANISATION (AAPSO) AND CHINESE DIPLOMACY**

The Bandung Conference in April 1955 was China's first opportunity to launch a diplomatic offensive towards penetrating the Third World in general and the Middle East in particular. During this conference, Beijing sought to bridge geographical distance, dispel fears among the participants of China's aggressive communist trends. It also wished to build a mutual understanding with the Asian and African countries by introducing itself as the leader of the developing nations of Asia and the third world besides presenting its five principles of peaceful coexistence along with giving a firm support to the Palestine Liberation Movement. China's ultimate objectives varied between widening the circle of its formal recognition and gaining the support of the developing countries for its entry into the UN, in addition to eradicating the Western 'imperialist' influence as well as presenting itself as a pronation list and anti-colonial alternative (Aborhmah, 2010). It was pointed out that "at the time of the Bandung Conference, friendly contacts made by our delegation with the Yemeni delegation" led to a progressive development and consolidation of links between the two countries and the negotiations between China and Yemen are described as a continuation of the Bandung and Cairo conferences. A favourable coincidence upon which the Chinese press remarked was

the fact that the Crown Prince's visit coincided with the Cairo conference Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) in December 1957 and the aspect of growing solidarity among developing countries is reflected in the description of the government of Yemen as being entirely "loyal to the spirit and principles of Bandung".

In the period after the Bandung conference several visits and pilgrimages were conducted by groups of Chinese Moslems. By that time the Chinese had founded their own institute of Islamic Theology and new premises for this institute were opened in Beijing to coincide with Mohamed al-Badr's visit. Later in the year, to mark the Corban Festival (July 1), the Yemeni leader Imam Ahmed sent a letter to Burhan Shahidi, a leading Chinese Moslem, wishing that: "Allah will bestow blessings on the Arab and Islamic peoples each year". As we have argued, China's tendency at the time was to downplay the role of Islam or if they accepted it at all to view it as a cultural or social phenomenon rather than as a belief. On the whole the Moslem dimension was not given a big place in China-Yemeni relations. There are reports of various Chinese groups visiting that country including diplomats, doctors, technicians but not specifically of Moslems (Biel, 1992).

**The China and North Yemen relations 1956-1962: republicans vs. royalists:**

Yemen was one of the first countries of the Middle East to establish contacts with the PRC. Relations between the PRC and North Yemen date back to the Yemeni royalist reign when both sides decided to form diplomatic relations in 1956. A Chinese legation to Taiz and a complement of Chinese workers were dispatched to the Yemen not long after the January 1957, Yemeni Crown Prince Mohamed al-Badr visited China was officially invited to China as the first Arab leader to visit the PRC (Binhuwaidin, 2001). His visit, which lasted from December 1957 to January 1958 on 20 March 1958 China and Yemen signed a Treaty of Friendship, culminated in the signing of a trade and cooperation agreement between the two countries. The agreement included sending Chinese technicians and skilled workers as per a 10 years arrangement. At that time, Beijing defended Yemen's claims to territories under the British protection (Aborhmah, 2010). The accompanying agreement on scientific, technical and cultural cooperation included China's offer of a non-interest bearing loan of 70 million Swiss francs. Yemen was by no means, however, the sole beneficiary of China's attention and resource (Calabrese, 1991), treaty of friendship under which China granted Yemen an interest-free loan of \$16 million repayable in 10 years. By

the end of 1958 while hundreds Soviet technicians worked to construct a hospital as well as the port of Hodeida and to improve the international airfield at Sana'a, one thousand of their Chinese counterparts labored to engineer and build the 143-mile Sana'a-Hodeida highway, a textile mill and for China to provide an interest-free loan of \$140,000 (Binhuwaidin, 2001). In April 1958 there were further co-operation negotiations held at Sanaa between Mohamed al-Badr and the influential figure in Chinese diplomacy, Chen Jiakang, ambassador to Egypt who was also accredited to Yemen. Further, discussions took place in August of the same year and a speedy announcement made that China was to begin work in constructing the highway immediately. In announcing this co operation a Yemeni source in Cairo specifically linked it with the news that oil had been struck at Hodeida. By 1959, there were 600 Chinese and several hundred Russians and by 1960 there were over 1,100 Chinese laborers working on Yemeni roads (Orkaby, 2014).

Where the Yemeni leaders hinting that they would develop oil resources with Chinese or Soviet help and did they do this with the thought of getting better terms out of the latter or with the thought of scaring the West into making collisions? It is difficult to say. As the next few years were to show, al-Badr had his own aims and was prepared to ditch the Chinese when it suited him. No sooner was the road completed at the beginning of 1962 than the Chinese team was hurriedly ejected from the country and the Yemen government refused to pay for the work. Soviet experts were also expelled soon afterwards. All this occurred around the time of al-Badr's succession to the throne and the outbreak of open hostilities with the Republicans (Biel, 1992).

Imam Ahmed, in whose hands official power was highly concentrated, resorted to foreign policy as a means of holding in check restive tribal factions in whose hands actual (though fragmented) power resided. In this context, the Imam's invitation to the Soviets and to the Chinese who accompanied them was a reluctant undertaking: chiefly a response to a domestic political imperative. What is more, the China-Soviet option was an alternative rather than a preference, thrust upon the Imam by the reluctance of the United States to reply favorably to his overtures. Having negotiated successfully for Soviet weapons, the Imam whose fears of dissidents reportedly led him to hold one tribal hostage for every ten rifles he distributed left heavy equipment to rust, lest it fall into the wrong hands. The Imam's conduct was probably no less exasperating to the Chinese than to the Soviets for he flatly refused to pay either for arms or for construction work. Therefore, from the beginning, Chinese involvement in the Yemen was tied to the vagaries of local politics. Yet, at a time

when the PRC languished in diplomatic isolation, relations of any kind, particularly at relatively low cost, remained important to the Chinese leadership (Calabrese, 1991).

Despite this setback, China's relations with Yemen turned out to be fairly long-lasting. The Chinese-built road proved of a much higher standard than the US-built one which soon began to deteriorate and this made a favourable impact on public opinion. The Chinese were instrumental in launching a project which had the effect of introducing wage-labour into the country almost for the first time with everything this could imply in sociological terms. El Attar is clear on the fact that this project heralded the first emergence of a proletariat in the country. During the civil war from the early 1960s onwards, Chinese technicians were again present in the country and played a certain role in support of the republicans. Although, Abdel Nasser succeeded in insisting that Soviet aid be channeled through him and in using it as an instrument of his influence in the area, China managed to a considerable extent to prevent their own aid being manipulated by the UAR in this way (Biel, 1992).

Thus, while it certainly appears that al-Badr thought he was 'using' China, it was not necessarily he who had the last laugh. The Communist Party of China (CPC), understanding of the relationship in no way implied that they were 'cultivating' a particular regime or banking on its survival. They probably understood quite well that the monarchy was playing the communist 'card' for purely tactical reasons and were ready to take up the opportunity which this presented. As we have shown, the CPC was fairly open about the fact that they were building relations via a particular regime but with a popular current of struggle for national independence. For many years in the YAR many Chinese worked in building highways. Thus, China's overall foreign policy in the 1950s and early 1960s reflected China's early involvement in Yemen. The Chinese were compelled to adopt the Soviet Policy to align with the Soviets as they were against the West in Yemen. But the Chinese began to adopt a policy challenging the position of soviet in Yemen as China-Soviet was in a deteriorating state. But more than the Soviets Imam Ahmad received successful and visible aid from the Chinese in the YAR and also in the regime they did not influence in any way. However, it brought significant advantage for Yemen and China both sides. An Arabian Peninsula country as Yemen politically recognized China when they were diplomatically isolated. It assisted them to become a UN member. Also from China the Yemenis received financial and economic assistance, the Chinese gained a valuable political recognition from.

**North Yemen and China relations from the revolution to unification (1962-1990):** In 1962, after the assassination of Imam Ahmed (Al Badr) his son took the thrown and he was the new king of Yemen. In September 1962, Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) established after overthrowing the feudal kingdom in the North, an 8 years civil war between the supporters of Imam Badr and republicans which lasted till 1970 (Appendix in Table 2).

The Chinese side congratulated the Yemeni People on the victory of their revolution of September 26, 1962. It expressed firm support for the Yemeni People to safeguard their state sovereignty and territorial integrity in their struggle against imperialism which was just and reactionaries. It expressed its support for the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the Arab Republic of the Yemen and its appreciation of the efforts made by the Government of the Arab Republic of the Yemen in developing its national economy and culture striving and for social progress. The Chinese side expressed gratitude to the Arab Republic of the Yemen for its just stand of supporting the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations and opposing the "two Chinas" plot. After pro-Soviet revolution in September 1962 led by Colonel Abdullah Al-Sallal who proclaimed YAR, did not slow down the aid of China to Yemen. The treaty signed with the Imamate regime in 1958 was replaced by President Abdallaha Al-Sallal in June 1964 who made same kind of visit to Communist China and signed a new treaty of friendship and further agreements on technical, cultural and economic co-operation. A loan of USD 4.8 China was granted for YAR in 1962, November and in June 1964 one more loan of USD 28.2 million was given (Bartke, 1989). Meanwhile, to help in the construction of roads and various plants the Peking Government sent a groups of technicians and engineers and also extended an interest-free loan of USD 500,000 to the Yemeni Revolutionary Government (Masannat, 1966). In the same year both sides agreed to upgrade relations and Beijing as a result appointed its first resident Ambassador to the Yemeni Capital, Sana'a.

During the Yemeni Civil War between the Royalists and the Republican factions, Beijing encouraged the Yemeni Republicans to continue fighting when Nasser urged them to make peace with the Royalists in accordance with his agreement with the Saudis in this regard. Moreover, the Chinese experts actively carried out an important role in building bridges and roads through which the Yemeni republicans succeeded to penetrate the siege of Sana'a (Harris, 1993). These roads, actually, played a crucial role in the supply and transportation of the Egyptian tanks and artillery from the coast to the capital, Sana'a, during the Yemeni Civil War (Sheean,

1975). Yet, in the final analysis and despite Chinese financial and technical aid, Beijing enjoyed no tangible political influence in North Yemen and was not able to counterbalance the relatively large-scale Soviet military presence throughout the Yemeni Civil War. Nasser had to resort to abandoning his support for the Yemeni republican as the 1967 Arab-Israeli war defeat greatly weakened him. But to both parts of Yemen China provided continuous financial support, also providing hospital and building Constructions textile plants, roads as well as agricultural and medical assistance. The trade volume was increased with the Yemeni Arab Republic from USD 1.25 million in 1970, to USD 30.74 million in 1974 and USD 66.30 million in 1979 (Appendix in Table 3) (Binhuwaidin, 2001). In 1968, July 25th US imperialism supported Yemeni reactionary armed forces shamelessly bombarded the Chinese technicians residential who were in charge of Textile mills built by Chinese aid and several aiding projects in the, injuring Chinese technicians and damaging their living quarters and some areas of the ongoing constructions of the mill and machineries. It is a must to point out in the earlier of May 5th of concurrent year that the Chinese technician's residence was attacked by Yemeni armed forces. strongly US imperialism and Yemeni armed forces were condemned Strongly by the Embassy of China for this serious crime against China dishonoring the laws of international relations governance. The Chinese and Yemeni peoples have built a friendship which is profound through the lengthy anti-imperialism struggles and all of the attempt of US imperialism colonialism' will fail to ruin and subvert the Yemen-China friendship by making empty heinousness but with the lifted rock it will only just squash itself. The Embassy of China repeats that the proceeding from the interests of the Chinese and Yemeni Peoples. The Yemen Government and People are strongly supported by the people of China in their justifiable action to guard their national independence safely and oppose to the aggression of US imperialist.

On July 1972, in respond to the invitation of the Chinese Government, the YAR Government Delegation led by Mohsin Ahmed Al Aini, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister went to Peking on an official visit by an especial aircraft to China. On behalf of the people and Government of China, Premier Chou warmly welcomed the Prime Minister Aini and the other renowned guests from Yemen. He stated that Yemen opposes imperialism traditionally and Yemenis are courageous and hard-working people who waged struggles which was resolutely courageous and valiant for a long time against feudal rule and oppression and imperialist before finally winning liberation and national independence. Premier

Chou stated that Yemeni and Chinese people's relation in their prolonged fight in opposition of imperialists and to shape up their countries and since these countries were in diplomatic relationship, the cooperation and friendship between them have firmly grown based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. He conveyed sincere appreciation to the Yemeni people and their government for contribusting to reinstate China's lawful rights in the UN and all its concerned agencies and bodies. To summarize Premier Chou's speech, he highlighted the visit of Prime Minister Aini at the head of the Yemeni Government Delegation that in the long run would heighten the brotherly persuasion of cooperation and the relationship of friendship in between the Yemeni and Chinese peoples. The Yemeni Prime Minister stated that the relations between the People's Republic of China and the Arab Republic of Yemen started when Chairman Mao Tse tung achieved victory in the great Chinese revolution.

In North Yemen (YAR) China also concerned to likely smaller and 'high impact' tasks in order to make improvisation towards the circumstances of simple living. In September 1975 China revolved over to North Yemen the Taiz Revolutionary General Hospital that had been fabricated and given. Then, China consented to an arrangement in order to work for the foundation of an agricultural based experimentation stations in North Yemen. In June 1977 Beijing made the announcement to express the intention of dispatching medicinal groups towards YAR. In the same year, one of the Chinese delegations presented in San'a to make negotiation through the state company which has responsibility over preparing equipment for YAR's armed force and security department. As stated by Calabrese (1991), ultimately, not too far from the time of Chinese accomplishment of the Huth-Sa'dah leg of the San'a-Sa'dah highway both countries decided to sign a trade agreement.

In 1974, al-Iryani was conquered through Ibrahim Mohammed al-Hamdi, a colonel who stays extremely prominent right up'til the present time, however he governed the nation for just 3 years was assassinated in 1977. Hua Kuo-feng, State Council Premier, conveyed his sympathies on Chairman Ibrahim Mohammed Al-Hamdi's Death on October 13th to the YAR Command Council Chairman. The message said: "the late Chairman Al-Hamdi led the Yemeni people and made Positive commitments to battling dominion and imperialism, protecting the nation's freedom and sway and advancing national development and to building up the customary companionship between the Chinese and Yemeni people groups and the well-disposed relations and participation between our two nations. According to Hua Kuo-feng, State Council Premier, I trust that the Yemeni Government

and citizens will transform misery into quality, keep on advancing along the street of autonomous improvement and always accomplish crisp victories". He was quickly succeeded by Ahmed Hussein al-Ghashmi who endured scarcely eight months, before being killed thusly by an agent from Aden (Fen, 1977). In spite of the fact that it was not clear at the time, this denoted the end of the time of unsteadiness as another colonel Ali Abdullah Saleh acquired the governance in July 1978. Lackner (2014) added that Ali Abdullah Saleh, definitely, stayed in control for 33 years, considering him the longest-enduring ruler anyplace in Yemen from the time Ottoman period has come to an end. Along these lines, the political instability in South Yemen so exasperating to Beijing was coordinated through the condition of insecurity in Sana'a and intensified by a brief nationwide war between both neighboring nations. Even though intrigued by the result, China ceased from turning out to be specifically entangled in the neighborhood turmoil. Rather, China seemed to be depending on Saudi Arabia and the United States to safeguard North Yemen. Calabrese (1991) emphasized that however, not very many of the USD 100 million in American arms reserved for Sana'a and financed by Saudi Arabia were legitimately exchanged by Riyadh. Therefore, the Saudi-American association which Beijing showed up surrendered, if not substance to depend upon was undermined by the superseding impact of between Arab contention. In South, China's financial did not have any critical impact on the North of Yemen's administration. In November 1979, the North Yemeni government of Col. Ali Abdullah Saleh began purchasing arms from the Soviet Union. Binhuwaidin (2001) clearly states that meanwhile, Saudi Arabia offered Saleh \$300 million towards aiding and keeping Soviets out, the Soviets provided the responses with a \$1 billion arms programme in excess of upcoming 50 years for the North Yemeni military.

Meanwhile, Saleh's government, though accepting weapons from Moscow, pledged its adherence to nonalignment and opposition to entangling alliances. Saleh's October 1981 journey to Moscow did not necessarily signal a betrayal of these principles. It probably reflected instead mounting domestic pressures. Saleh's trip was most likely aimed at bartering a degree of accommodation with the Soviet Union in the form of: a deferral of the YAR's military debts and a Russian pledge to lean on the PDRY to end support of the National Democratic Front. Beijing persevered in seeking to offset, rather than to prevent, the possible strengthening of the Soviet position in North Yemen. Yet, because of the YAR's small market and deteriorating Foreign exchange position, China's efforts to build trade relations were

narrowly circumscribed. Winning construction contracts in the YAR was a more realistic (and ultimately a more successful) approach. In 1978, on the basis of competitive terms that matched the YAR's austerity, China won four construction contracts in North Yemen: to build an airport and a heliport and to design two roads. The following year, China agreed to transform and expand a Sana'a textile factory. Overall in 1979, the Chinese Construction and Engineering Company (CCEC) entered into twenty project agreements with the YAR. It was in Yemen that China first experimented with joint venture construction activities, entering an agreement to form the Yemeni-China Building and Engineering Company. The aim of this endeavor was participation in housing construction projects outside as well as within North Yemen. Beijing also signed a protocol in this period, calling for the dispatch of a sixty-member medical team to the YAR. At the point when Saleh got to be president in 1978, the Cold War was at its stature and various nations considered Yemen as a battlefield. The Communist administration in South Yemen was firmly partnered with the Soviet Union and East Europe, the main Soviet station on the Arabian Peninsula. The United States was not having any consulate in the South, North Yemen, then again, settled great relations with the United States and the West furthermore with Saudi Arabia and the other firmly hostile to Communist Arab states of the Persian Gulf Calabrese (1991).

#### **The PRC and South Yemen relations 1967-1990 (a strategic communist bridge):**

In November 1967 the people's Democratic Republic of Yemen was established in the south following a 4 years liberation war against British colonial rule. In the initial period after independence China appeared to have acquired a position of influence in South Yemen as great as that of the USSR. The Chinese press hailed the independence of the country and carried favorable reports of the new government as well as of the praise which South Yemenis were quoted as according China and its leader, Mao Tse-tung said: The Chinese people regard the victory in the anti-imperialist struggle of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America as their own victory and give warm sympathy and support to all their anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggles. The editorial declared that the just struggle of the people of Southern Yemen against imperialism headed by the United States and in defence of national independence would continue to enjoy the wholehearted support of the 700 million Chinese people. (Tsetung, 1967). An agreement on diplomatic relations was signed on 31 January, 1968 and a Chinese embassy was finally opened in July 1969 with one of China's most

experienced Arabian experts, Li Chi'ang-Fen, serving as ambassador. The Government of the People's Republic of China has recognized the People's Republic of Southern Yemen and the latter's sovereignty over all its territories and islands. The People's Republic Government of South Yemen acknowledged the People's Republic Government of China to solely represent the Chinese people's legal government. These two Governments came in agreement in developing a relationship of co-operation and friendship in between these countries in confirm to the principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, mutual and equal benefit, peaceful coexistence and mutual non-aggression (Hua, 1968, 2013). But even before this embassy opened, a PRSY delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Saif Ahmad al-Dhalai had visited Peking in September 1968 and had signed two agreements, one on trade and one on economic and technical co-operation. At this stage, China offered the PDRY a long-term interest-free loan of USD 12 millions, to cover 5 years of development projects (Schichor, 1979). In August 1970 a PRSY delegation headed by President Salim Rubai Ali visited China and a further loan of USD 43 million was offered under a new economic and technical agreement. Chinese aid was directed to a number of projects in South Yemen in the first decade after independence: constructing a textile mill at al-Mansura, outside Aden, building a road along the 315 miles to Mukalla, constructing a hospital in the Crater District of Aden and expanding the salt works in the Khor Mkasar District of Aden (Halliday, 1985, 2002).

In South Yemen also in 1975, groundbreaking ceremonies marked the beginning of China's technical assistance in the construction of a farm tools and hardware factory". Notes were exchanged between Chinese and South Yemeni officials announcing agreement on China's construction of a 224 km road from Shihir to Sayhut. In December of the same year, the two countries signed an industrial cooperation agreement planning for the construction of a yarn mill. Further, road construction agreements were concluded following China's completion of the Mahfid-Mukalla highway in 1977 (Calabrese, 1991). It seemed like China favored in paying extra consideration to improve its bonds with the PRSY government and they tried to impress it with substantial economic aid. China signed technical collaboration arrangements and also numerous financial trade and with the retitled PDRY and aided in construct of factories bridges and roads.

In 1968 the China's trade value with the PDRY improved when the formal relationship was established. In 1967, the bilateral trade value hurdled from USD 1.5 million

to USD 3.9 million and in 1972 USD 11.20 million approx. Thus, the South Yemeni government did not want to align itself with either power against the other. The Yemenis wanted to learn from the Chinese experience in building socialism but they also wanted to remain close with the Soviets. They preferred an independent Foreign policy where they could balance between the two giant socialist states. At the end of the visit, the two sides signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation under which China granted a loan of \$9.6 million. The most significant aspect of the visit and its outcome was that it took place in the midst of the Chinese cultural revolution. There are very few examples of the Chinese involving themselves in agreements with foreign countries during the cultural revolution. Hence, a brief analysis of China's association with Southern Yemen proposes that the Chinese could not waive substantial chance to draw themselves nearer to the afresh socialist-born state in the center of the Arab world (Binhuwaidin, 2001). In a banquet speech, Tung Pi-wu, Vice-Chairman of the PRC, praised the South Yemenis long struggle against imperialism and their support for revolutionary armed struggle against imperialism around the world. He said: companions and friends! The present cordial official visit to our nation by administrator Salem Rubai Ali at the leader of the appointment of Southern Yemen originating from more than thousands of miles away is an extraordinary inspiration and support to the people of China. We trust that this visit will unquestionably reinforce the mutual understanding and significant friendship between our two peoples and make critical commitments to the improvement of the co-operation and amicable relations between our two nationals and to the fortifying of the African and Asian individual's normal reason for solidarity against government. I wish our recognized visitors accomplish in their visit.

At long last, I would like to propose a toast to the militant friendship between the citizens of China and Southern Yemen, to the triumph of the Palestinian and other Arab citizens in their war against US. Israeli hostility, to the triumph of the three Indo-Chinese people groups, battle against US hostility and for national salvation, to the anti-imperialist battles, to the flourishing and quality of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen and the prosperity of its own individuals, to the soundness of his excellency Chairman Salem Rubai Ali, to the well-being of the various recognized visitors from Southern Yemen. In his banquet speech Salim Rubai Ali praised the Chinese people's struggle against imperialist powers and said: the two sided relations between these two countries and two peoples did not start only now and nor does it start from our present meeting. It started from

a very long time ago. The relationship is profound and a brief review of history will prove that. We will strive to strengthen the strong friendly relations between the Yemeni people in our People's Republic of Southern Yemen and the great Chinese people through our present visit. Comrades! We the people of People's Republic of Southern Yemen will continue our mission and strive to consolidate and safeguard revolutionary fruits in order to save them from the harm of colonialist schemes despite of the damage and chaos caused by mercenary troops aided by US imperialism and Saudi reactionaries on our national border and economic sanction imposed on our Republic. We will fulfill our duty to support and aid the national revolutionary movement under the control of people's front for the freedom of occupied Arabian Gulf and national liberation-movement on the entire Arabian Peninsula. We will do so as we believe that the actions of imperialism and the reactionary forces are against the Arabian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula, against the revolution in Southern and Northern Yemen and closely linked with the wide schemes engineered by US imperialism in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia which was against the Indo Chinese people (of Vie Nam, Cambodia and Laos).

China and South Yemen saw eye to eye on numerous issues. China had a certain experience on maintaining good relations with Yemen which was derived from China's relation with YAR after 1962 like USSR. China was even one step ahead of USSR in believing to be even handed between two parts of Yemen and supported Yemeni Unity Policy explicitly.

Leaders of South Yemen has acknowledged their debt to China. Saif al-Dhalai stated in his speech in 1968 that Chinese Liberation war is a great example for all countries to fight back and break free from imperialism. According to Salim Rubai Ali, South Yemen has been benefited from the experience of Chinese people in defeating colonialist and imperialist and in infuriating the aggressive schemes against revolution. He also stated that the Yemen is grateful to China for their friendly behavior and support for the people of South Yemen (Ali, 1970).

At same time, leader of the P.D.R.Y. Government Delegation Abdul Fattah Ismail also spoke at the banquet. He said: "although, we are separated by vast oceans, we are linked together by the militant friendship of our two peoples and the common objectives of our struggle". There exist old and long-standing relations between the peoples of Yemen and China. And it is to further strengthen and consolidate these relations that we have now come here. The two sides pointed out with satisfaction that the current visit to China by the Government Delegation of the People's Democratic

Republic of Yemen led by His Excellency Ismail had made a useful contribution towards further consolidating and developing the friendly relations and co-operation between the two countries and strengthening the militant friendship between the two peoples. This visit has been crowned with complete success.

Some people of South Yemen who looked favourably on its internal system and who shared some of its criticisms of the USSR were sympathized Chinese revolution. In 1971, President Salim Rubai Ali encouraged his people to benefit from the experience and sincerity of the Chinese people' and in 1972 he advanced a policy of 'self-reliance' for the PDRY that appeared to be influenced by China. However, in spite of apparent Chinese encouragement, Yemeni leaders did not lend their support to the Chinese criticisms for Russia. Successive Congresses of the South Yemeni front from 1968 through to 1975 had stressed the need for unity in the socialist bloc and the dangers of division. This message was repeated time and again by South Yemeni politicians (Halliday, 1985).

In the 7 days demonstrations of July 1972 Salim Rubai Ali echoed Chinese views on economic development. By then China had already begun to alter its policy on the Gulf: Peking's military aid to the PFLOAG ceased in 1971 and whereas Abd al-Fattah Isma'il had during his 1972 visit to Peking denounced 'conspiracies against the Arabism of the Gulf, a reference to Iran in 1973 China gave support to Iran in its campaign against 'subversive activity' in the Gulf, i.e., popular front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) (Halliday, 2002).

The 2 years later in 1970, the name of the PRSY was altered to be the People's Democratic Republic of the Yemen (PDRY) and the new regime in Aden was supported by both the Soviets and the Chinese. Beijing's interest in South Yemen was usually linked and attributed to the Chinese awareness of the strategic importance of Aden as a southern gateway to the Arabian Peninsula as well as a bridge to the Horn of Africa and Oman where Beijing had some strategic political and ideological aspirations, on the one hand, in addition to its rivalry with Moscow and the naval presence of the latter in the Indian Ocean, on the other (Calabrese, 1991).

At that time, the anti-imperialist National Liberation Front (NLF) not only ruled the country but some important provinces such as Hadramout were governed by a radical Marxist pro-Chinese wing that launched some key reforms on the Chinese model. They formed 'people's council's, adopted anti-religious educational policies, confiscated land and then redistributed them to the landless peasants, nationalised financial institutions and

Foreign trade and established a 'People's Guard' which was armed and organized by the Chinese in line with the Chinese 'Red Guards'. The Yemeni 'People's Militia' came to be an offset to the PDRY regular military forces which were armed and trained by the Soviets. Seemingly, South Yemen was considered by Chinese leaders to be within the 'course of socialist development'. The extreme left faction became more left orientated because of its fiasco to extend its power over the entire country. At that stage, relations between the PDRY and the PRC grew steadily stronger to the extent of encouraging the latter to accredit its largest diplomatic mission in the region to Aden. The activities of the Chinese diplomatic mission were wide and extended to cover the whole Middle East. Divisions among the leadership of the NLF were obvious. The PDRY as was the case in the YAR was an arena for an apparent Sino-Soviet political and ideological rivalry. Whereas the NLF President, Salim Rubai Ali was considered to be Maoist and pro-Chinese and used to frequent Beijing, the General Secretary of the NLP, Abdulfatah Isma'il was regarded to be pro-Soviet and used to visit Moscow. The rift, according to Yodfat, merely reflected personal rivalry for power and was not of ideological foundations (Ibid). The PDRY hugely benefited from the economic aid that was offered by the PRC and received 20% of the latter's aid in the Middle East. In 1970, for instance, Aden received Chinese aid of nearly 55 million pounds. More importantly, knowing that Riyadh was not happy with the existence of a Socialist regime living next door, Salim Rubai Ali was given Beijing's implicit support against Saudi Arabia during a state visit to the PRC (Halliday, 2002; Calabrese, 1991; Behbehani, 2015). Also, in this regard, the Saudi leftist-dissenter Nasser Al-Said who was tied to President Jamal Abdunnasser of Egypt and used to live in South Yemen paid a visit to the PRC to seek some support from Beijing against the ruling political system in Riyadh.

There can be no doubt that the Chinese and Soviet Marxists-oriented infiltration and competition to gain a foothold in South Arabia in general and in the PDRY in particular which resulted in the emergence of a Marxist regime on the Saudi doorstep had unmistakable implications for the national security of the Kingdom. An example of such menace was obvious during 8 days visit to the PRC by an official PDRY delegation that arrived in Shanghai on September 1968. The Yemeni delegation was warmly welcomed and then throughout the visit program was lectured by the Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, Marshal Ch'en Yi, about the importance of following the Chinese pattern of national democratic revolution against imperialism, colonialism and the

extermination of feudalism in the PDRY and about the unconstructive impacts on the Yemeni regime due to some of its close 'reactionary and feudal' neighbors namely Saudi Arabia.

The Chinese Foreign Minister sought to provoke the Yemeni delegation against Riyadh by harshly attacking the intentions of the Saudi monarchy. He claimed that it is not your country only over which feudalism has domain for you are aware that you have such influential neighboring country who is practicing feudalism in worst measure. You are surrounded by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where the people are subject to a reactionary feudal system. You do know better than us about the intentions it harbors towards your country. This system is not only feudalist; additionally, it exploits religion in objectionable manner due to its presence in the areas sacred to Muslims and its claim to protect and supervise these areas. You must be utterly conscious of this and understand the importance to use religion as weapon which the Saudi ruling family employs to prevent the liberation and progress of the people in this region. You do need to understand that this system receives complete and utterly support from the American imperialism due to the immense wealth in the Kingdom's territories above all, oil and due to the strategic location of Saudi Arabia and its influence on advancement in the Arab region and the Islamic nations (Behbehani, 2015). The Soviets, on the other hand were keen to challenge the Chinese influence in the PDRY which was thought to be the first Marxist-Leninist state in the Arab World and 'as a base for operations in neighboring parts of the Arab Peninsula and the Horn of Africa' (italic added). They, consequently, raised their military aid gradually in the 1970s to reach more than USD 2 billion by 1983 (Aborhmah, 2010).

The KGB as well was heavily involved in South Arabia during the early 1970s by establishing and sustaining a number of anti-Chinese radical movements around South Yemen. The Soviet strategy was two-fold. It firstly, allowed them to entirely weed the Chinese out of the PDRY by 1974 and draw the country into the Soviet camp. In addition, it gave them an opportunity to train and arm some guerillas of radical political movements in the Arabian Peninsula such as the so-called Saudi Arabia National Liberation Front (SANLF), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) and the Front for the Liberation of Dhofar (FLD). Sakharov and Tosi, put emphasis on the challenge and danger of these radical movements to Saudi national security by arguing that 'the struggle of these obscure tribes in remote Yemen may appear to be paltry but for the Saudis it represented a real threat'. Since, China's fear of Soviet penetration of the

world in general and the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region in particular rose in the early 1970s, China's Foreign policy with the YAR and the PDRY reflected its concern. It even supplied arms to the PDRY in a small-scale (Creekman, 1979). It improved its trade volume with the PDRY from USD 3.84 million in 1970 to USD 12.59 million in 1974 and USD 20.37 million in 1979. However, China's continuous commitment to aid and support for the PDRY did not lead to the establishment of a Chinese influence over the South Yemeni regime, nor the disengagement of the Soviets from that country. Instead, the pro-Soviet group gained the upper hand in South Yemen. Salim Rubai Ali was ousted in June 1978 by Ismail, who signed a 20 years friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in October 1979 (Page, 1985). Soviet influence, including the presence of naval bases, became predominant in the PDRY (Creekman, 1979). These developments improved relations between China and South Yemen. This was apparent in China's reaction to North Yemeni President al-Ghashmi's assassination. China showed its sympathy for the YAR by publishing the Sana'a government's version of the assassination instead of Aden's version in the media. The PDRY government was leaning towards the Soviet Union because it perceived that the presence of the United States in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region which had been developing in the early and mid-1970s, posed an increasing threat to the South Yemeni regime during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The South Yemeni government trusted that the profoundly crucial advanced weapons and maritime insurance that the Soviet Union could give to ensure the South Yemeni administration couldn't be given by China. In spite of the fact that China proceeded with its help to the PDRY in building streets and material plants and also in broadening a credit of \$12.5 million, its activities were minimized after the Maoist-oriented Salim Rubai Ali faction lost in its struggle with supporters of the Soviet model of communism (Binhuwaidin, 2001). The central issue of disagreement was however, Soviet influence in the PDRY itself. As early as 1971, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai mentioned the PDRY as one of several countries in which Soviet military influence was increasing (Shichor, 1979). By contrast, Chinese officials and press reports praised the YAR for the measures it had taken after 1970 to reduce its relations with the USSR (Peking Review, 09.07.1976). It was with the June 1978 crisis the assassination of President Ahmed Hussain al Ghashmi of the Yemen Arab Republic that Chinese coverage of events in the PDRY became markedly more critical. A roundup of Gulf press coverage. For example, Saudi Arabian paper and Kuwaiti paper on the June 1978 crisis commented: 'articles and commentaries exposing

Soviet intervention or by implication mainly give the idea that this crime is aimed at undermining security and stability in the Red Sea and Gulf regions' (Zhoubao, 1978). The 1979 inter-Yemen war was blamed on Soviet interference.

A later report, on the March 1979 YAR-PDRY unification agreement went further and provided the fullest analysis hitherto produced of how China viewed the situation in the PDRY. The 1972 unity agreement had it said, not been realised because of Soviet and Saudi sowing of dissension between the two Yemens. Signs of inter-Yemeni rapprochement were interrupted in 1978 by the death of the two presidents: 'it was widely known that the Soviet KGB and Cuban mercenaries were behind the two deaths,' it was claimed. The article argued, against all historical evidence that the division between North and South Yemen was the result of Britain's having imposed the 1934 Treaty of Ta'if on the Imam but recalled that resistance to it had continued: the brilliant feudal and colonial rule ought to have provided promising conditions for national unification. But as soon as the tiger left, the wolf-those who wanted to manipulate the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf oil resources and control these strategically important areas came along. Such external forces used a variety of strategies to exploit differences and contradictions between local tribes, religious factions and political parties. By using fire arms or economic aid as bait or ideology as a tool, they turned one side against the other. They tried to establish control through agents in order to stop Yemen's unification.

By the end of the 1970s Sino-PDRY divergences affected virtually the whole range of major Foreign policy issues: not only did China support Iran and Somalia but it endorsed Egypt's rapprochement with Israel. China had, by then, warmer diplomatic relations with the YAR and Oman than it had with the PDRY, a preference reflected in the higher ranking of PRC representatives visiting the YAR. From 1974 onwards the pace of diplomatic relations between the two countries slackened. PDRY Foreign Minister Muhammad Salih Mutiyya visited Peking in 1977 as did Premier Ali Nasir Muhammad in April 1978 but while the latter did lead to a new economic agreement these were not followed by the signing of joint communique's as had resulted from the PDRY leader's visits of the early 1970s. A PDRY envoy dispatched to explain the circumstances of the June 1978 events was received by the Chinese but from the evidence of Chinese press coverage, his version of events was not accepted. Yet an element of restraint and continued interest was shown by both sides. Relations between China and South Yemen never reached the point of open animosity evident in the late 1970s in relations between China and such

Soviet third world allies as Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia and Afghanistan. The PDRY press abstained from explicit criticisms of China, although the 1978 and 1980 YSP Congresses did not repeat the policy enunciated at earlier congresses of developing relations with all socialist countries 'without exception'. Inside the PDRY itself, the Chinese experts working on aid programs continued to be the object of considerable esteem and affection, despite the growing gap in international alignment of the two states (Halliday, 1985).

On only one occasion, a visit to Ethiopia in 1979, did a South Yemeni leader, 'Abd al Fattah Isma'il, openly criticise China and this incident was quickly contained. On their side, the Chinese were careful as to the form their criticism took. Thus, the 1978 leadership crisis in the PDRY and the 1979 inter-Yemeni war were alleged to be the result of Soviet influence and the Chinese press continued to look for signs of positive development in South Arabia in the reconciliation of the PDRY with its three neighbours, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and Oman in 1976, 1979 and 1982, respectively. Reporting on the improved YAR-PDRY relations of 1982 Chinese reports went out of their way to stress that the PRC did not endorse the activities of the NDF which had, it was said, 'carried out disruptive anti-government activities in a few urban areas of North Yemen'.

Chinese emphasis lay as it had done throughout the post-1967 period on improvement of relations between the two Yemeni states. The growing divergence between the PDRY and the PRC arose from the very different situations in which they found themselves and the resulting difference in the policy requirements of the two states. If China's main preoccupation was its conflict with the USSR, the PDRY was primarily concerned about its conflicts with its neighbours. For a certain period from 1967 until the early 1970s, Chinese foreign policy also involved opposition to the west to the USA in particular and hence support for the radical causes which the PDRY also backed in the region. Even at this time, however, the PDRY refused to follow Chinese urgings all the way and criticize the USSR, because of Aden's need for Soviet military support in its confrontations. But, side by side with this disagreement, the two states, China and South Yemen, did have certain convergent policies from 1967 to 1971. With the changes in Chinese policy attendant upon the end of the Cultural Revolution at home in 1969 and China's 1971 entry into the UN abroad, China ceased to support most guerrilla groups in west Asia and turned instead to the construction of a diplomatic alliance with all those Middle Eastern and third world states that were opposed to the USSR-South Africa, Israel and South

Korea excepted. Thus Iran, Ethiopia and Egypt became states to which China drew closer and as a result relations with Aden grew cooler (Halliday, 1985).

Moreover, despite their own differences with each other and their conflicting policies towards South Yemen, both the USSR and the PRC maintained some common views on the evolution of a radical state in South Arabia. Both the USSR and the PRC established relations with Aden after some years of experience and influence in the YAR. This anterior commitment both tempered their optimism about the possibilities of change in the South and gave them an alternative point of contact in the region, one which had albeit in differing degrees to be balanced against support for the South. Both warmly welcomed the triumph of the NLF in November 1967 and the further radicalisation of June 1969. Both provided comparatively large sums of economic aid in the most difficult years, up to 1975 when South Yemen was receiving support from almost no other source. Most importantly, Moscow and Beijing saw the PDRY as a state that had in some degree, sought to break away from a predominant Western-dominated pattern of international politics and with which they, therefore had some affinity.

Therefore, three further aid agreements were signed: in July 1972 on the occasion of a visit by Secretary-General 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il in November 1974, when President Salim Rubai Ali paid a second visit to Peking and in April 1978 when prime minister' All Nasir Muhammad made an official visit. By the end of 1980 China had provided aid estimated at USD 84 millions, the largest Chinese aid programme in the Middle East and one of Peking's largest anywhere in the third world (Halliday, 1985). China's development aid to South Yemen mainly consisted of development of multiple textile enterprises, salt works and medical aid but primarily the building of a strategically important road to connect the third district with the fifth (about 500 km) including wells and bridges alone it. Several hundred Chinese worked on these projects. Consequently, South Yemen became the only country in Middle East to receive more economic aid from China than from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Shichor, 1979).

**China and the Yemens in the 1980s:** The key danger to the survival of the South Yemeni administration which was suspected by Aden to be on the top in the mid-1980. The foundation of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) was translated as a support of the professional Western position in the district through co-operation and common assurance and against radical gatherings in the area. Moreover, the expanding number of US action in Indian

Ocean and Red Sea bowl made PDRY to be concerned which was an aftereffect of President Jimmy Carter's arrangement to safeguard Western interests in the locale. In 1981 and 1982, the United States along with other countries like Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Egypt and Oman conducted the 'Bright Star' maneuvers which South Yemen considered as a direct American threat to the South Yemeni regime.

Several efforts to overthrow the Marxist regime from South Yemen was sponsored by Saudi Arabia. "Yet even at the peak of Yemeni cooperation in Saudi North during 1970s, the way they helped has become a source of contention. North Yemen is a country of less wealth. Before the oil was discovered in 1984, a little income from domestic sources was earned by Yemeni government of North which made it difficult for the government to control the powerful tribes of Northern Yemen. Saudi Arabia mainly contributed in their annual budget. But Saudi Arabia also provided financial aid to strengthen tribal leader, government and military officials. This is what made Yemeni government lose control over local tribes and became difficult to make them follow any policy without involving Saudi Arabia. However, in order to maintain the smooth flow of the economy and avoid conflict, the government had to put up with the situation. The discovery of oil in Northern Yemen was another issue to contribute to tensions between Riyadh and Sanaa. Oil was discovered near Marib which is in the east end of North Yemen, a region where border has yet not been set by Yemeni or Saudi. Saudi Arabia began to assert territorial claims in the region where oil was found and in other regions where oil companies began exploring".

Considering the circumstances, the Chinese government got itself constrained to apply impact on both piece of Yemen. While China seeks better relations with the United States and the countries of the Gulf region to cultivate some economic aid limited relations with the South Yemeni government and gradually trade developing relations in the early 1980s. However, further China's economic relations with North Yemen on a large scale to develop. Principally because China believed that unlike the South, North Yemen was not a Soviet satellite. A standout amongst the most essential components of China's outside strategy towards the two Yemens in the 1980s was China's request that both Yemens enhance their relations with neighboring Gulf and Arabian Peninsula nations keeping in mind the end goal to fortify their solidarity against foreign intervention. China encouraged and welcomed the rapprochement of relations between Saudi Arabia and the two Yemens. Saudi Arabia resumed its aid to the YAR throughout the 1980s to help the country cover its budget deficit and in 1989 the

Kingdom lifted almost all restrictions imposed on Yemeni migrant workers, giving them almost equal rights with Saudi citizens. The Kingdom also moved positively to ease its strained relations with the PDRY. China additionally respected the standardization of relations between the PDRY and Oman, South Yemen's main rival in October 1982. (Binhuwaidin, 2001). The Chinese viewed such developments as a positive strategy towards strengthening the security of the Peninsula region against Soviet and US manoeuvres to dominate the region (Pang, 1980) (Appendix in Table 4).

The Chinese considered such improvements as a positive procedure towards fortifying the security of the Peninsula district against Soviet and US moves to dominate the region. In March 1987, PDRY Premier Yasin Sa'id Nu'man went for official visit to China. The Chinese government consented to help South Yemen with more monetary, specialized and social backing and consented to reschedule the reimbursement of Chinese advances to Aden. It likewise consented to help South Yemen in building a 44.5 km interstate with a Chinese credit of \$30 million. The Chinese government likewise kept on sending delegations to partake in South Yemen's National Days. Then, China-YAR relations were fortified further. YAR President Ali Abdullah Saleh went by Beijing in December 1987. This was Saleh's first visit to China since he became president. In their gatherings with the meeting President, the Chinese authorities centered their announcements and addresses on applauding North Yemen's neutral outside approach and its separation from the Soviet Union. In a banquet speech to the visiting President, Chinese President Li Xianmian said: the Chinese government admires the foreign policy of the Arab Republic of Yemen in international affairs. The Arab Republic of Yemen has taken after an approach of neutrality, non-arrangement and great neighborliness and made a dynamic commitment to fortifying the solidarity among Arab nations and safeguarding peace and provincial dependability. He added: we have treasured-our friendship and cooperation with the Yemen Arab Republic and we are ready to strengthen friendly relations and economic and technical cooperation between their two countries under the principles of equality and mutual benefit, making emphasis on practical results, adopting various ways and realization of common development (Binhuwaidin, 2001).

Chinese-Yemen have agreed to provide North with a loan of \$40.32 million with no long term and build a road 127 km of Heghana Mareb. In short, China's relationship with North and South Yemen in the 1980s were carried out on the basis of China's determination not to let the two countries call completely to the will of the Union

Soviet. The goal, China has provided financial and technical support on both sides. However, China has provided more aid to North and South. This could be explained in terms of satisfaction of China's Foreign policy of nonalignment of North Yemen.

**Yemen-China Bilateral relations (during Ali Abdullah Saleh Administration 1990-2012):** Yemen is a large and strategically important country in the southern Arabian Peninsula bordering Saudi Arabia, Oman, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden within the Arabian Sea (Terrill, 2011). Yemen was a divided nation with North Yemen partnered with the United States and South Yemen partnered with the Soviet Union. This division ended in 1990 with the unification of the two Yemens on May 22, 1990 to form the Republic of Yemen (Almadhagi, 1996). North Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh became the president of the Republic of Yemen and South Yemen's Ali Salim al-Baid became the vice-president. Sanaa was chosen as the nation's political capital while Aden became the nation's economic capital. The geographical location of Yemen makes it an important country for the China because; it enables it to observe three very tense areas which are the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea and Horn of Africa. In this regard, Yemen can be considered as a geographical belt encompassing the Southern part of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula which controls Bab al-Mandab and the navigational routes in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.

China was among the first nations to extend its recognition to the newly established republic in Yemen. Yang Shangkun, Chinese president, sent a congratulatory message to Saleh, Chairman of the Presidential Council of the Republic of Yemen on the following day of its proclamation. Yang Shangkun said:

"On the occasion of the deceleration of the establishment of the Republic of Yemen, I, on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, wish to extend my warmest congratulations to Your Excellency Mr. Chairman and through Your Excellency Mr. Chairman to the people of Yemen. Through friendly consultations the Yemeni leaders have fulfilled the great task of unification. This is an event of great significance in the history of Yemen. China has had very close relations of friendship and co-operation with both South and North Yemen and has always supported Yemen's unity, stability and peace. The Chinese government and people respect this historical choice made by the people of Yemen. We wholeheartedly hope the unification of Yemen will help Yemen develop and help bring peace and stability to the local region. We wish the Republic of Yemen prosperity and its people happiness. May Sino-Yemeni relations of friendship and co-operation continuously consolidate and

develop" (Binhuwaidin, 2001). President Xi Jinping said to Yemen's President that China and Yemen and the two peoples enjoy profound traditional friendship, bilateral cooperation has developed smoothly in all areas and the two countries support each other on issues concerning each other's core interests and major concerns. No matter how the international situation changes, both sides are always each other's reliable good friend, good brother and good partner. China attaches great importance to developing China-Yemen friendly cooperative relations, respects Yemen's sovereignty and independence, respects the development road chosen by the Yemeni people independently and supports Yemen's political transition process and economic reconstruction. China is willing to conduct friendly exchanges with the Yemeni government, legislative bodies and political parties, exchange experience in governing state affairs and dealing with politics, focus on bilateral cooperation in fields such as electric power, energy, communications, transportation, infrastructure construction and offer help to Yemen in fields such as sanitation, education, culture and sports. China encourages more competent Chinese enterprises to invest in Yemen and hopes that Yemen can provide safe and good business environment for the Chinese companies and staff. China supports Yemen to fight terrorism and safeguard national security and is willing to strengthen bilateral cooperation in counter-terrorism and in combating pirates. China will continue to push the international community to provide support and assistance to Yemen (Hua, 2013). China's support for the Yemeni unification emanated from its concern over Soviet and US penetration in the region. To the Chinese government, a divided Yemen could easily bring more foreign interventions in Yemen's affairs, especially from the two superpowers. However, a united Yemen could prevent such a possibility. Therefore, the Chinese government continued to pay attention to Yemen's domestic developments following early 1994 disputes between the different parties over power in Yemen.

The Republic of Yemen's President Saleh expressed his appreciation for China's support for the reunification of Yemen and China's assistance in Yemen's economic development. Saleh made the remarks at a meeting with the visiting Chinese government delegation led by Minister of Energy Resources Huang Yicheng which had arrived to participate in the celebration marking the first anniversary of the Republic of Yemen.

Chinese officials continued to speak highly of Yemen foreign policy throughout the second half of the 1990s. They stressed China's appreciation of Yemen's peaceful, neutral, good-neighbouring Foreign policy' and its efforts to boost relations with neighbours and other Arab

states. They also looked at Yemen as a major force to maintain solidarity among Arab states and safeguard peace and stability in the Red Sea and Gulf region (Binhuwaidin, 2001) (Appendix in Table 5).

In 2006, in Beijing, President Hu Jintao said that China will continue to cooperate in trade and energy with Yemen. This will be done to enhance bilateral relations between both countries. Hu indicated that on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties, China would like to work with Yemen to carry on the past, open a way for future and further strengthen bilateral friendship and cooperation in the following three aspects. First, to promote dialogue and exchanges at all levels and continuously build up mutual political trust. Both sides should strengthen communication and consultations between their leaders and governments and reinforce friendly exchanges between their legislatures and parties as well as bilateral coordination and cooperation in international and regional affairs. Second, to vigorously expand mutually beneficial cooperation in the areas of economy, trade and energy and pursue common development. Both sides should offer trade facilitation to each other, improve trade mix, actively explore new approaches and ways for expanding trade and steadily enhance the level of bilateral economic and trade cooperation. China supports and welcomes businesses of the two countries to increase investment in each other and would like to expand bilateral cooperation in the areas of energy, infrastructure construction and fishery. Third, to conduct in-depth exchanges in other fields and consolidate bilateral traditional friendship. It is hoped that both sides will promote all-round development of their contact and cooperation in humanities and other areas by commemorating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties so that China-Yemen and China-Arab friendship can be deeply rooted in the hearts of the people. In his meeting with President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saleh noted that Yemeni people have always held profound friendly feelings towards Chinese people. Since, the establishment of diplomatic ties 50 years ago, bilateral friendly cooperative relations have been developing smoothly and economic and trade cooperation has scored great achievements. Last year bilateral trade volume reached 3.5 billion US dollars. The Yemeni government is satisfied with sound development of bilateral relations and thanks the Chinese government for its support in all aspects for a long period of time. He emphasized that Yemen will continue to resolutely adopt the one-China policy and as always support its grand cause of reunification (Honge, 2006), the President said, "China supports and welcomes the enterprises to increase their investment in the two countries and is willing to expand

cooperation with Yemen in such areas as energy, infrastructure and fishery". In return, when he met Chinese businessmen in Beijing and Hong Kong, President Saleh said that investors willing to invest at least \$10 million in the local economy would be offered free land. In addition, Yemen was assured by China that it will assist in economic development by providing millions of dollars at low interest. Businessmen from Yemen who accompanied Saleh during the trip also were given promises of greater access to markets in China market (Zhenming, 2008).

China's investments in Yemen are primarily to promote its own economy although some sectors in Yemen's economy have benefitted. China established diplomatic relations with North Yemen in 1956 and with South Yemen in 1967. China supports Yemen's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as its unification. Yemen is the first country in the Arabian Peninsula and the third country in the Arabic world to acknowledge the PRC as the legitimate representative of all China. Yemen stands for the restoration of China's legitimate membership in the United Nations and its 'One China Policy'. The two countries share similar views on many international and regional issues and have consistently rendered understanding and support for one another.

Formal economic, scientific and technical assistance between the two countries was coordinated by the 1958 Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation (ETC) which remains effective and features China's first friendship treaty in the Arab World. China has given huge interest-free loans to Yemen between 1960 and the mid-1990s for the construction of infrastructure, tarmac roads, a textile mill and hospitals (Appendix in Table 1-4).

After a visit in 1998 by President Saleh to China, several agreements and protocols were signed by both sides. In particular, China undertakes to increase Yemeni gas consumption in the Chinese markets and Yemen will sell oil and gas directly to Chinese companies without the brokerage of the London market (The official SABA news agency of research and Information Center in 2006).

The Yemen-China bilateral trade volume accounted for USD 731 million in 2002 but exceeded USD 5 billion and 550 million in 2012 (Embassy of China in Sana'a Interview in 2013). Yemeni oil exports to China accounted for USD1.7 billion in 2012. Yemen's economy is highly dependent on oil production with the country's oil exports accounting for 70% of government revenue. Yemen is also seeking investment to exploit its potential as a major exporter of LNG, another area of growing Chinese interest (Zhenming, 2008). In 2012, it was agreed

that three natural gas-fired power plants be developed and four 5,000 megawatts power plants using coal and diesel be built in Yemen by the China Corporation for Overseas Economic Cooperation (CCOEC) in Belhaf and Ma'abar cities. Under this Agreement, China would install power cables and gas pipeline in Safeer-Ma'abar. Additionally, in 2012, Beijing was also awarded a contract to expand two container ports in Aden and Mokha at a cost of USD 508 million. China also agreed to give a soft loan to finance these projects. Up to now both China and Yemen continue to cooperate in projects beneficial to both parties.

### CONCLUSION

From the discussion above we can see that the PRC's foreign policy vis-a-vis Yemen from October 1949 up to the late 1980s has been influenced by the PRC's foreign policy with the US and the USSR. By the 1990s available data indicate that there was a change, the PRC's relations with Yemen was based on the PRC's economic and political interests. The PRC's interest in Yemen in the 1950's was started by the USSR's earlier involvement there. At that time the PRC was a supporter of the USSR's attempts to take advantage of the anti-Western feelings in Yemen and was also giving economic assistance then

North Yemen regime. At that time, the PRC was also a supporter of North Yemen's claim over the then UK-controlled South Yemen. But, with the passage of time PRC-USSR relations started to diverge and they became competitors with each other in Yemen. The PRC's financial and economic assistance to Yemen was so substantial that it even exceeded the quantum offered by the USSR. With the worsening PRC-USSR relations, South Yemen became more important in the PRC's foreign relations strategy with the PRC assuming the role of a leader in the socialist camp as well as in the Third World. The South Yemeni force's revolutionary activities captivated the interest of the PRC and it stated to provide them with the necessary political, financial, technical and military support. But, when the USSR made a bigger presence in South Yemen, the PRC chose to align themselves with the US and the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula states inclusive of North Yemen, to oppose the USSR's influence in South Yemen. As such the PRC drastically reduced their support and assistance to South Yemen in the 1980s and meanwhile its relations with North Yemen improved drastically and rapidly. By the 1990s, the PRC became a strong supporter of a unified Republic of Yemen (RY) and its interest in the RY escalated drastically when the newly-formed republic became one of its major oil suppliers.

### APPENDIX

#### Appendix 1: China's aid to the Yemen (YAR) 1958-1987

Contract	Years	Loan scheme
Agreement on scientific, technical and cultural cooperation	12-1-1958	China granted an interest-free loan of \$16 million
Protocol on the construction of the Sanaa-Hodeida road and the building of a textile mill	23-1-1959	China granted an interest-free loan of \$0.14 million
Protocol on the Sanaa-Hodeida Road	13-3-1962	--
Protocol on economic and technical co-operation	24-11-1962	China granted a loan of \$4.8 million
Agreement on economic and technical co-operation	9-6-1964	China granted an interest-free loan of \$28.2 million
Protocol on the construction of a textile mill in Sanaa	23-3-1965	Construction was started in September 1964 and was completed in March 1967
Well-drilling	1967	From 1967 until 1969 Chinese technicians drilled several wells in the Sanaa-Hoth section of the Sanaa-Sada road
Sanaa-Sada road	9-1967	The construction started in September 1967 and was opened to traffic in July 1977
Education aid	3-1968	The Chinese Ministry of Education donated 283 crates of teaching materials to Yemen
Protocol on the construction of a technical school	14-7-1969	The school was a present from the Chinese. It had four classes specialising in auto, electrical machinery maintenance, house construction and road and bridge construction. Chinese teachers worked until 1976
Agricultural station	12-1971	The construction of an agricultural technique experiment and popularisation station at Batina was established in the fall 1976 with Chinese assistance. The station cultivates sorghum, maize, wheat, cotton, sweet potatoes and vegetables
Minutes of talks on building a hospital in Taiz	16-3-1972	It was opened in September 1973 and has 220 beds and the capacity to attend >500 patient per day
Agreement on economic and technical co-operation	21-7-1972	China granted a loan of \$22.1 Million
Oil pressing mill	1973	A Chinese team concerned with the building of a cotton ginnery and an oil press in Sanaa. It constructed of an oil-pressing mill connected to the Sanaa Textile Mill. This oil-pressing mill processes the cotton seeds supplied by the ginning workshop of the textile mill

Appendix 1: Continue

Contract	Years	Loan scheme
Amran-Hajja road	9-1974	The construction started in September 1982. It is 76 km long and reduces the distance of the transportation between Western Saudi Arabia and Sanaa by over 200 km
Protocol on the despatch of a new Chinese medical team	7-6-1977	The group consisted of 30 person
Protocol on the construction of a conference hall	19-12-1978	It was to be built with Chinese assistance. Nothing was heard of this project
Cotton ginning and oil pressing plant	1978	A Chinese team worked on a study for the construction of this project, located in an eastern Suburb of Hodeida
Protocol on the despatch of a new Chinese medical team	16-4-1979	-
Helicopter parking apron	8-1979	The Road and Bridge Construction Company of China signed a contract to construct the apron in the republican palace and completed in 1980
Extension of a roundabout	8-1979	The project was in the northern suburb of Sanaa and was completed in 1980
Contract on the construction of two roads	8-1979	These roads were in Sanaa and the project was completed in 1980
Protocol on the transformation and expansion of the Sanaa Textile Mill	12-1979	-
Protocol on the despatch of a new Chinese medical team	29-1-1980	Initially the group was consisted of 51 person. It was planned to raise its number to 116
Office building	7-1980	The office building of the Yemeni Radio and Television General Administration Corporation was put to use in July 1980 with Chinese aid
Contract for the establishment of China-Yemen Joint Furniture Enterprise Co., Ltd.	10-1980	The company is to manufacture furniture suites in steel and wood. This factory was expected to be completed by March 1981 with production equipment provided by China
Mokha-Mufrah road	11-1980	Construction of the road started in September 1980 and was completed in November 1981. The road was of economic significance because it links the southern port of Mokha to the Hodeida highway
Contract on the construction housing project	5-1981	The housing project located in the southern suburbs of Sanaa and started with Chinese assistance
Contract on the construction of a hospital for gynaecology, and children in Sanaa	19-7-1982	The work started in September 1983 and was opened in obstetrics November 1988. China provided this project with building materials, medical apparatus and instruments worth about \$9.43 million
Contract on improving the Sanaa-Sada road	7-9-1986	The contract was signed between YAR and two Foreign companies, one Chinese and the other Federal German. The fund was to be provided by the Federal German as a gift
Contract for building water and sewerage project in the cities of Ibb and Zhamar	15-9-1986	-
Loan and road agreement	26-12-1987	China granted \$40.32 million to construct Heghana-Mareb road. The work started in December 1988

Appendix 2: China's aid to PDRY 1968-1987

Contract	Years	Loan scheme
Agreement on economic and technical co-operation	24-9-1968	China granted a loan of \$9.6 Million
Protocol on the dispatch of a Chinese medical team	4-12-1969	China's medical aid started in 1970
Protocol on economic and technical co-operation	30-7-1970	
Agreement on economic and technical co-operation	7-8-1970	China granted an interest-free loan of \$43.2 million in repayable in 20 years
Minutes of talks on the construction of cotton textile printing and dyeing enterprise and the reconstruction the Khomaksar salt works	7-7-1971	The work on Aden textile, printing and dyeing mill was started in December 1972 and completed in December 1975. The of expansion of the Aden salt works started in October 1973 and it was completed in June 1976
Minutes talks on the construction of a road, the Zingibar and on drilling wells	16-8-1971	The Am Ain-Mukalla road was constructed with Chinese bridge assistance and completed in October 1977. The Zingibar bridge was built with a free interest loan from China and was opened in June 1984
Agreement on economic and technical co-operation	12-7-1972	-
Minutes of talks on the construction of the Mahfid-Mukakka road	24-3-1973	The construction started in early 1974 and was completed in October 1977
Agreement on economic and technical co-operation	13-11-1974	-
Notes exchange on the construction of the Shihir-Sayhut road	8-5-1975	-
Protocol for the construction of a State-Owned Fishery Company	-6-1976	The work was started in March 1977 and completed in December 1979. It included a fast freezer, refrigeration facilities, repair shop, netting shed, offices and store houses

Appendix 2: Continue

Contract	Years	Loan scheme
Minutes of talks on building the Aden Friendship Hospital	12-7-1976	A 200-bed hospital was to be built gratis with Chinese assistance in Aden
Protocol on continuing to sent Chinese medical teams	15-4-1978	-
Agreement on extending	-4-1979	-
US\$12.5 million loan to South Yemen	-	-
Protocol on economic and technical co-operation	24-5-1982	-
Contract on continuing to send Chinese medical teams	2-7-1984	The number of medical personnel was to increase from 41-50 fi-om 1984-1986
Contract on a project of irrigation and levelling of soil	20-11-1985	-
Agreement economic and technical co-operation	15-3-1987	-
An agreement on establishing a joint committee for economic technical co-operation and trade		

Appendix 3: Value of China's trade with the (YAR) 1955-1989 (US\$ million)

Years	Exports	Imports	Total
1955	N/A	N/A	N/A
1956	0.01	N/A	0.01
1957	-	N/A	-
1958	0.09	N/A	0.09
1959	3.62	N/A	3.62
1960	1.20	N/A	1.20
1961	1.30	N/A	1.30
1962	0.46	N/A	0.46
1963	0.21	N/A	0.21
1964	1.14	0.02	1.16
1965	4.25	0.71	4.96
1966	2.02	0.36	2.38
1967	0.97	0.49	1.46
1968	1.19	0.47	1.66
1969	1.92	-	1.92
1970	1.25	-	1.25
1971	3.94	0.92	4.86
1972	5.03	1.62	6.65
1973	12.79	2.74	15.53
1974	26.64	4.10	30.74
1975	18.21	3.99	22.20
1976	33.44	5.74	39.18
1977	34.99	7.26	42.25
1978	39.70	3.24	42.94
1979	63.31	2.99	66.30
1980	79.15	-	79.15
1981	58.99	2.72	61.71
1982	60.37	1.96	62.33
1983	81.00	N/A	81.00
1984	57.00	N/A	57.00
1985	39.00	N/A	39.00
1986	25.00	N/A	25.00
1987	17.00	N/A	17.00
1988	27.00	N/A	27.00
1989	35.00	N/A	35.00

Appendix 4: Value of China's trade with the PDRY 1967-1989 (US\$ million)

Years	Exports	Imports	Total
1967	1.54	N/A	1.54
1968	1.80	N/A	1.80
1969	3.69	N/A	3.69
1970	3.80	0.04	3.84
1971	4.56	0.88	5.44
1972	7.38	3.81	11.19
1973	15.29	3.81	19.10
1974	12.59	N/A	12.59
1975	18.55	0.01	18.56
1976	11.50	1.38	12.88
1977	13.86	0.02	13.88
1978	19.73	2.14	21.87
1979	20.37	N/A	20.37
1980	23.25	0.74	23.99

Appendix 4: Value of China's trade with the PDRY 1967-1989 (US\$ million)

Years	Exports	Imports	Total
1981	30.81	3.69	34.50
1982	36.57	N/A	36.57
1983	53.00	N/A	53.00
1984	36.00	N/A	36.00
1985	28.00	2.00	30.00
1986	21.00	N/A	21.00
1987	25.00	1.00	26.00
1988	37.00	N/A	37.00
1989	22.00	1.00	23.00

Appendix 5: Value of China's trade with the Republic of Yemen 1990-1996 (US\$ million)

Years	Exports	Imports	Total
1990	74.00	2.00	76.00
1991	71.00	N/A	71.00
1992	74.00	74.00	148.00
1993	112.00	255.00	367.00
1994	85.00	149.00	234.00
1995	108.00	344.00	452.00
1996	106.00	570.00	676.00

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